in Europe. Yet, in cross-national perspective, the Swiss unemployed emerge as quite an inactive social group (Giugni 2008) .
Why are the unemployed in Switzerland politically so inactive? Drawing in particular from the social movement literature, several explanatory factors may be mentioned. First, the unemployed might simply not be interested in political mobilization. These are people who, quite understandably, are more worried about their economic situation and who struggle to get a job rather than becoming involved in some kind of political activity. Second, the low level of mobilization may be due to the lack of an "objective" condition that gives rise to grievances about the situation of the labor market. The political mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland may be lagging behind that observed in other countries because unemployment is lower and therefore the number of jobless people does not create a "critical mass" large enough for a social movement to form. 1 Third, the low level of mobilization of the unemployed would stem from the (missing) social construction of the "problem" of unemployment as well as the discursive practices relating to collective action itself and to its relation to societal issues. In other words, the unemployed may have difficulties in motivating people for action, identifying causes and consequences (prognostic frames) of a given problem, defining unemployment as an unjust condition, blaming the political authorities or someone else for this condition, and so forth.
2 Fourth, a strong collective identity to be engaged in the struggle for better conditions might be lacking.
3 Fifth, there might be a lack of internal resources. 4 As compared to other social groups and movements, the unemployed are certainly very badly equipped in terms of resources and organizational structures, which resource mobilization theory has shown as being a necessary condition for protest to occur. Finally, the structure of political opportunities may not be favorable to the emergence of a movement of the unemployed. 5 These explanatory factors are likely to be interrelated and to have a cumulative impact on the political mobilization of the unemployed. We argue in particular that, in Switzerland, all these aspects-the low level of interest in politics by unemployed, their low level of resources, the lack of a collective identity, and the framing of the unemployment issue in the public domain, which tend to discourage the unemployed to mobilize-stem from a specific political opportunity structure relating to certain characteristics of the Swiss welfare state. Indeed, the low level of mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland represents a puzzle in light of the characterization of the generally open political opportunity structure for the mobilization of social movements in this country, which should and indeed does lead to much protest, although a moderate one (Kriesi et al. 1995) . We argue that the unemployed face a specific political opportunity structure, stemming from the dominant conception of the welfare and the way in which the unemployment issue is framed in the public domain, which goes in the opposite direction, that is, in the direction of limiting the space for their mobilization. Before we elaborate this argument further, a brief overview of the situation with respect to unemployment and the policy responses to it is in order.
The Emergence of the "Problem" of Unemployment and Policy Responses
In Switzerland, unemployment became a relevant political issue during the 1990s. This country has, compared to other European countries, a very short history of unemployment. Until the 1990s the Swiss labor market was in a situation of nearly full employment, with a number of registered unemployed below 1 percent of the active population. The low unemployment rate of Switzerland was until the 1970s partly due to anticyclical policies that were based on foreigners and women, two categories that were pushed out of the labor market when the economic situation worsened (Bonoli and Mach 2001) . This solution was no longer applicable after changes in the immigration practice and the better integration of women in the labor market. More generally, labor market regulations in Switzerland are traditionally characterized by the combination of a liberal type of regulation and relatively generous unemployment social benefits as well as by the combination of a comparatively lower trade union power due to a low unionization rate and a tradition of negotiation among social partners. These features have allowed Switzerland to keep a low rate of unemployment, even with a very weak growth as it has been the case in recent years. However, the situation of unemployment changed quite dramatically in the early 1990s, when a deteriorating economic situation had also an impact on the Swiss labor market. In 1991, 68,000 persons were unemployed, which corresponds to 1.8 percent of the active population. 6 A first peak of unemployed was reached in 1997, when 162,000 persons were without a job (4.1 percent). After a short period of economic recovery, the number of unemployed rose again and reached in 2003 the highest level ever with 186,000 people without job, which corresponds to an unemployment rate of 4.1 percent. In addition, parallel to the rate of unemployment, the number of underemployed people (i.e., people who have a part-time job) is also increasing. At the same time, the public opinion has become to view unemployment as a relevant political issue in the 1990s. While for decades unemployment was not among the main worries of the Swiss population, starting from 1990 it has become a priority issue. For example, unemployment was considered the most important problem by Swiss citizens in 2003. 7 The development of welfare policies took place later in Switzerland than in other European countries. 8 In general, the Swiss social policy is very static as reforms take a long time to find a way through the federal structure and the procedures of direct democracy. Unemployment policies are an example of the late development of welfare policies: a basis for a mandatory unemployment insurance was included in the Constitution in 1975 and the related legislation was implemented in 1982. However, important changes in legislation and practice occurred in the 1990s, when the unemployment rate rose significantly and the social security system was subject to economic pressure. Responding to increasing unemployment rates and to the emerging public debate, unemploymentinsurance legislation was revised a first time in 1990 and then again in 1995, and 2002. Urgent measures and changes were also introduced in 1993, 1999, Duvanel (2002) has stressed the fact that, as unemployment started to grow, the law has been in a situation of constant revision and adaptation. This is also a consequence of the Swiss welfare state, which is not built on a model or societal project, but rather emerged in a pragmatic way as a response to conjunctural evolutions (Fragnière and Christen 1988) . The main changes implied by all these revisions concern the amount and duration of social benefits, the conditions for eligibility, and, in the 1995 revision, a shift toward active measures. The latter are meant to help the reinsertion of jobless people in the labor market through formation and training as well as other forms of individual aid. They also aim to put an end to the passive perception of unemployment allowances. The open question is whether these measures are interpreted as help to insertion into the labor market or rather as a punishment for being "inactive." Since the Swiss unemployment social benefits system is insurance-based, these moves toward an obligation to furnish a counterpart to social benefits can be interpreted as a tightening of the management of unemployment and control of the unemployed. This might mark the beginning of a fundamental shift from welfare to workfare (Cattacin et al. 2002) .
The 1995 revision introduced a related important change with the creation of a new placement system: the Regional Placement Bureau, a special office devoted to the reinsertion of the unemployed. This office personifies the ambiguity of activation measures (Duvanel 2002; Valli, Martin, and Hertz 2002). 9 They are conceived as help to the unemployed in their quest for a job, but at the same time they can force them to take a job or a course and have the power to sanction the unemployed by suspending their right to allowances in case of misbehavior. Similarly, the most recent changes have followed a trend toward the tightening of the conditions of the unemployed. For example, the definition of the jobs the unemployed are supposed to accept has been broadened, the level of social benefits compared to the salary one had when employed has been brought down from 80 to 70 percent, the duration of social benefits has been shortened from 520 to 400 opening days, the necessary contribution period required to be eligible for social benefits has been increased from six to twelve months.
As compared to other European countries, the level of social benefits for a lack of job is relatively high in Switzerland. However, one major criticism can be held against the legislation on unemployment. According to Cattacin et al. (1999) , it does not take into consideration long-term unemployed that no longer fulfill the requirements of unemployment insurance. More generally, the Swiss situation with respect to the institutional approaches to unemployment is kind of paradoxical: comparatively, unemployment social benefits are high, and the objective conditions of unemployed are better that in most other European countries, but at the same time strong stigmata are associated with the condition of being unemployed. 10 The unemployed are easily suspected of being responsible for their situation. Thus, since 1992, the law was clearly oriented toward the fight against abuses (Duvanel 2002 an institutional mistrust concerning the reasons for their condition, putting them in a situation in which they have to constantly prove that they are not responsible for it and that they are doing everything in order to get out of it. In other words, the problem of unemployment is becoming the problem of the unemployed (Valli, Martin, and Hertz 2002) .
To summarize, at least concerning unemployment, the Swiss welfare state can be characterized as having rather restrictive policies both in terms of the formal criteria of eligibility to social rights and provisions and the obligations relating to eligibility (Berclaz, Füglister, and Giugni 2004) . We argue that these characteristics lead to an unfavorable opportunity structure for the political mobilization of the unemployed.
The Specific Opportunity Structure in the Unemployment Political Field
The idea that contentious politics is channeled in important ways by existing political opportunity structures is one of the most consistent findings of social movement theory today. State-related aspects such as the degree of openness of the institutionalized political system, the prevailing strategies of the authorities toward protest, and the configuration of power within the institutional arenas are most often used to explain the emergence of social movements as well as cross-national variations in the extent and forms of protest (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) . In this perspective, Switzerland offers social movements many opportunities, both formal and informal, to mobilize, which lead to high levels of mobilization and moderate action repertoires (Kriesi et al. 1995) . As a result, the mobilization of the unemployed should be more important and moderate than in countries in which opportunities are less favorable, such as, for example, France. However, recent work on immigration and ethnic relations politics has stressed the role of what we may call specific (or perhaps better, sectoral) political opportunity structures (Berclaz and Giugni 2005) , which impinge upon the claim-making of actors who intervene in this political field (Koopmans et al. 2005) . In addition, this work points to the need to distinguish between the institutional and discursive side of such specific opportunities. Institutional opportunities can be defined as options for collective action that provide actors with different chances and pose different risks from one context to the other (Koopmans 2004) . They determine the access provided by the political system to challengers for their mobilization. Discursive opportunities can be defined as the chances that movement identities and claims have to gain visibility in the mass media, to resonate with other actors' claims, and to gain legitimacy in public discourses (Koopmans et al. 2005) . In other words, they define which political positions are more likely to become visible in the public domain, which identities and claims are more likely to find an echo with respect to other claims, and which identities and claims are more likely to be considered as legitimate in public discourses. Following this perspective, we explore the role of specific opportunities for claim-making in the field of unemployment in order to examine to what extent the actors, interests, and collective identities involved in the employment political field are inf luenced by certain aspects of their institutional and discursive context. To do so, we focus on the characteristics of the welfare state as a specific political opportunity structure shaping the claim-making and structuring the public discourse on unemployment (Giugni, Berclaz, and Füglister 2009; Giugni 2010) . We argue that the prevailing view of the welfare state in a given country impinges in significant ways upon the "contentious politics of unemployment"-that is, the public debates and collective mobilizations pertaining to unemployment-in that country. Dominant conceptions of the welfare state define a political opportunity structure that enlarges or constrains the options for action by collective actors that intervene in this field.
Although the specific opportunity structure in the field of unemployment politics has both an institutional and a discursive side, here we focus on the discursive context and the framing of the issue of unemployment. We argue that the specific ways in which the issue of unemployment is framed in the (dominant) public discourse provide discursive opportunities that channel the claim-making by the unemployed. We further suggest that these ways of framing the issue of unemployment, in turn, stem from the prevailing conception of the welfare state and, more specifically, from the prevailing view concerning the rights and duties of the unemployed in Switzerland.
Discursive opportunities point to the fact that the mobilization of collective actors in a given political field does not depend solely on a moreor-less favorable institutional context. It stems also from certain cultural and discursive conditions. In the social movement literature, it is the socalled framing approach that has most thoroughly dealt with these aspects (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992; Gamson 1992 and 1995; see Benford and Snow 2000 and Snow 2004 for reviews). This approach stresses the linkages between existing interpretations of objective facts and events, on the one hand, and participation into social movements, on the other; between the movements' interpretive and discursive frames and mobilization. However, the focus in this theoretical tradition is put on how political mobilization depends on the cognitive processes that underlie the evaluation of a given situation, of possible solutions, and motivations for action (Snow et al. 1986) , as well as the creation of feelings of identity, injustice, and agency (Gamson 1995) . In other words, at least in its original formulation (Snow et al. 1986 ), this approach looks at the ways in which collective action frames emerging from within social movements can help their efforts at mobilization. The concept of discursive opportunities can be seen as an attempt to bridge this literature with the political opportunity approach by looking at how framing processes occurring outside the movements and stemming from institutional settings and arrangements channel the movements' mobilization. 
Public Discourse on Unemployment
The main goal of our analysis is to explore some of the possible linkages between the Swiss approach to unemployment, on the one hand, and the opportunities for mobilization provided by the structure of public discourse on unemployment issues, on the other. One potential linkage lies perhaps in the stronger presence of employer's organizations and groups in claim-making in the field ( table 9.1 ). 12 These organizations are among the most important actors overall, and definitively the most important among civil society actors (20.7 percent of all claims). Labor organizations and groups, in contrast, are much less present (8.7 percent of all claims). Furthermore, employers' organizations and groups are not only the most active type of actors among civil society actors, they are also those whose claims are most detrimental to the rights and position of the group of the unemployed. This can be seen in the right-hand column of the table, which shows the average discursive positions of the categories of actors considered. The average position of the employers (-.31) stands in strong opposition to those, for example, of the labor sector (.80) and nonstate welfare actors (.91), which are most in favor of an improvement in the rights and position of the unemployed. In such a situation, organized unemployed not only finds little support by political allies within the institutional areas (institutional opportunities), but also encounter an unfavorable discursive context to the extent that their collective identity and claims receive little visibility in the mass media, they do not resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and they have little chances to achieve legitimacy in a public discourse dominated by actors who frame the issue of unemployment mainly in economic rather than in social terms and who tend to make claims that are detrimental to the rights and position of the unemployed (discursive opportunities). The average discursive positions suggest a further hypothesis concerning the absence of the unemployed, one that takes into account the behavior of other actors, this time not acting "against" the unemployed, but on behalf of them. If we look at the table, we can see that, in addition to labor organizations and groups as well as nonstate welfare organizations and groups, there is an important share of claims made by other civil society actors and groups, which have a relatively high average discursive position. In other words, a rather important sector of the civil society participates in the public debates on unemployment (12.3 percent of all claims) with the aim of improving the rights and position of the unemployed (average discursive position of .52). Thus, other collective actors might act on behalf of the unemployed, who remain absent from the public domain in part due to the unfavorable discursive context stemming from the central place of employers' organizations and groups in the public debates. However, the actors that generally take a position that aims at an improvement of the conditions of the unemployed, such as, for example, the trade unions, speak first for the workers and only then make claims aiming the unemployed. In order to be heard, the unemployed have to share an alliance with actors that only defend their interests in the second place. Furthermore, nonstate welfare organizations and groups focus their involvement on the integration of the unemployed into the labor market, whereas their political commitment stays quite weak. Therefore, even if these organizations can be seen as potential allies for the unemployed, such an alliance does not give much visibility to the claims of the unemployed in the public sphere.
The important role played by the economic milieus and the political organizations that defend their interests can also be seen by having a closer look at the claim-making by political parties ( table 9.2 ). Right and center-right parties dominate the scene (58.9 percent against 39.2 percent for left parties), although the socialists are the most active single party, followed by the Free-democratic party. Extreme-right parties are much less active, indeed nearly absent from the public debates on unemployment. The crucial issues for these parties lie elsewhere, most notably in immigration politics and in the safeguarding of national sovereignty and identity. Discursive positions can also be used to have a sense of the policy positions of actors with respect unemployment and the constituency of the unemployed. They provide a picture of the alliance and opposition systems as they express themselves through the claim-making in unemployment politics. In other words, they allow us to observe the multiorganizational field of unemployment in the public domain. If we look at the average discursive position of actors (tables 9.1 and 9.2), we observe the presence of a polarized situation with two quite distinct camps: a "pro-unemployed" camp who is clearly in favor of measures that improve the rights and position of the unemployed (made above all by labor as well as nonstate welfare organizations and groups, state agencies, and other sectors of the civil society) and a camp who is more conservative in this respect (made above all by employers' organizations and groups), with the state (except for state agencies) somewhere in between. These two camps are reflected in the traditional left-right opposition in the party system, with the extreme right that is in a way out of play, as we said. The organized unemployed must deal with this situation in their claim-making and their mobilization is channeled by this pattern of positioning by other collective actors, for example, by leaving little room for claims that are made by other actors on their behalf. Clearly, the specific opportunity structure in the field of unemployment politics is an unfavorable one in this respect.
We expect the thematic focus of claims to be the aspect most directly linked to institutional approaches to unemployment and the related structure of discursive opportunities ( table 9. 3 ). If we look at the general categories, the main pattern seems at the same time quite clear and reflecting the principal features seen thus far: socioeconomic issues regarding the labor market are by and large the most important thematic focus of claims in unemployment politics in Switzerland (71 percent of all claims). Actors who intervene in this field tend to locate the problem of unemployment and its solution in the market and the economy, as can be seen in the high proportion of claims concerning macr-economic issues (32.5 percent). This does not mean that the state plays a marginal role, but its role is largely seen as consisting in regulating the labor market, as the share of claims focusing on state policy regarding the labor market attests. Claims focusing on welfare systems and social benefits (14.9 percent), just as those concerning individual insertion in the labor market (11.9 percent), are much less important. Among the former, the largest share deals with unemployment insurance, which is little surprising for a country that has a strongly Bismarckian welfare model based on the insurance system of social benefits. Furthermore, during the 1990s there have been a number of revisions of the law on unemployment insurance, each time creating a public debate.
The framing of the problem of unemployment mainly in socioeconomic terms, of course, ref lects in part the crucial role played by the economic milieus and the organizations defending their interests in the public debates on unemployment. However, the main point for our present purpose is that this provides the unemployed with a discursive opportunity structure that gives more visibility, resonance, and legitimacy to claims that focus on the (labor) market rather than the group of the unemployed. This can also be seen in the low share of claims focusing on issues regarding the constituency of the unemployed, which by definition placed the group at center stage (1.8 percent). Furthermore, within the general category of socioeconomic issues concerning the labor market, claims on state policy regarding the labor market (i.e., the phenomenon of unemployment) are much more frequent than claims on state policy regarding the labor forces (i.e., the group of unemployed). This indicates a framing of the problem of unemployment that is more economic than social, a framing that puts forward economic regulation rather than social citizenship. Finally, we can look at the object actors of claims in unemployment politics ( table 9.4 ). Object actors are those actors whose interests are affected by the (realization of the) claims. In other words, this is the constituency that is at the center of the contentious politics of unemployment. An interesting feature of the Swiss situation in this respect is the important place taken by workers and employees as objects of claims (54.8 percent of all claims). This can once again be interpreted as reflecting an institutional approach to unemployment, which focuses on the economy rather than on the social groups of excluded, an approach that stems in part from the historically low levels of unemployment in this country, but which we may also interpret as a result of the specific opportunity structure in this field. In particular, workers and employees of a company represent nearly one-third of all objects, suggesting an approach that aims not only to find the solutions to unemployment in the functioning of the economy, but also at the local level. This may be seen as reflecting a reactive rather than a proactive approach to the problem of unemployment and a search for short-term rather than long-term solutions. Furthermore, when the group of unemployed is the object of claims, this occurs above all in general terms (24.3 percent of claims referring to other and unspecified unemployed). To summarize, in Switzerland the unemployed do not find much support from state actors and political parties. The discourse is dominated by the economic aspects of unemployment and largely eschews its social aspects. The public discourse on the contentious politics of unemployment in Switzerland is expressed in a discussion around the conditions of the workers and focuses on the economic dimension. The unemployed themselves constitute, in this perception, individuals that have temporarily lost their job. This kind of framing gives little visibility, resonance, and legitimacy to collective identities and claims that focus on the social and structural aspects of unemployment. In such a framing scheme, the solution to the problem is seen in a good functioning of the labor market, and leaves little space for policy solutions focusing on the individuals already excluded from the labor market. Most importantly, such an institutional and discursive context constrains the formation of organizations and networks of unemployed, their activities and forms of action, and their policy impact. 
Organizations and Networks
To examine the organizational structures of the unemployed in Switzerland we can again use information gathered in the UNEMPOL project. The networks of voluntary associations play a crucial role in the civil society's development since they create channels of communication and of exchange between individuals and organizations. In addition, a dense social network can constitute a resource for a minority group in terms of social capital, a resource that may help establish a basis for trust and action (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 . The number and type of unemployed organizations is particularly important because they provide the infrastructure upon which a collective identity can rest. This is especially true for groups that are structurally fragmented like the unemployed, which face difficulties creating a collective identity (Fillieule 1993) . Generally speaking, the organizational structures of the unemployed are quite fragile. The unemployed constitute a deprived population affected by three types of deprivation: economic, social, and political. Economic deprivation stems from the diminished economic resources following the loss of a regular income. Social deprivation comes from the lack of remunerated work, which in contemporary society has a central position as a social integrator and a marker of social position. Political deprivation can be seen in the lower degree of confidence in democratic institutions and the lower degree of political participation. To these three aspects, we may add a fourth one-psychological deprivation (see Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel 1933; Schnapper 1981 )-seen, for example, in the feelings of uselessness and isolation. Taken together, these four types of deprivation make the unemployed, like other "poor people's movements," less likely to produce structures and organizations that favors their political mobilization. As a result, the organizational structures of the "movements of unemployed" tend to be weaker and more short-lived than that of other movements.
To be sure, unemployed associations have indeed been created, but they are not very structured, have poor resources, and lack visibility in the public sphere. The level of organization and mobilization is dependent on the most active members, and the strong turnover among members and especially in the leadership weakens these organizations considerably. Furthermore, it is difficult for potential partners to work with them, as the contact persons and the political orientation of the organizations change quite often. The interviews we have conducted with unemployed organizations and with other actors involved in the field show that the most active unemployed organizations are those that are not run by the unemployed themselves.
13 This underscores the crucial role of leadership and political entrepreneurs for a social movement (Oberschall 1973) , especially so if other resources are scarce or even lacking completely. The analysis of Duvanel (2002) , who has spent two years of participant observation in an unemployed organization, confirms this point as well as the difficulties faced by unemployed in collective action.
Most unemployed organizations are local. National structures that have sometimes been created are very weak, dependent on the involvement of local 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 232 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 232 9/26/2011 9:47:47 PM 9/26/2011 9:47:47 PM members, and are often short-lived. In addition, often unemployed and prounemployed organizations do not engage in political activities, but restrain themselves to help jobless people, avoiding the use of their scarce resources in political-oriented action. Thus, neither unemployed nor pro-unemployed organizations have the sufficient means, willingness, and visibility to mobilize in an effective way the unemployed or on behalf of the unemployed. As a result, the unemployed must rely on existing actors that are not "specialized" in supporting the unemployed (unions and leftist parties). In fact, for this type of actors, unemployed are not a priority. This does not mean that unemployment is not an important issue, but that the unemployed as a constituency group are not central in their political agenda. The way the debate is framed puts the unemployed at the margin of public discourse on unemployment. In addition to single organizations, the network structure is also an important aspect of the organizational structures of the unemployed that deserves to be analyzed. Using our interview data, we can see the position of unemployed organizations in the network of relationships among actors in the field of unemployment. When we asked the selected organizations to mention the most important actors in the field, unemployed organizations were seldom mentioned, if at all, except for one notable exception: the ADC Chaux-deFonds (ADC NE), the organization that launched a successful referendum against the decision of the federal government to reduce the level of unemployment social benefits in 1996. This organization ranks thirteenth among a list of forty-two actors. However, this respectable ranking seems to be more an homage for that action than a recognition of the actual importance of the organization.
We also asked actors to mention those they try to influence, collaborate and disagree with. Focusing on collaborations, we can see that unemployed organizations (ADC BS, ADC GE, ADC NE, ADC VD, Surprise ) are peripheral actors in the network structure in the field. They collaborate to a certain degree among each other as well as with leftist parties (mostly at the local level) and unions ( figure 9.1 ). The most interesting aspect in this respect is perhaps that unions represent an important bridge between unemployed organizations and other actors. In other words, they play the role of brokers in the network structure. Yet these potential allies do not consider the unemployed as a crucial issue, although they are indeed interested in the issue of unemployment. Finally, we should note the very weak degree of collaboration among unemployed organizations and welfare organizations that are fully or partly devoted to giving direct aid to the unemployed.
Concerning influence and especially disagreements, unemployed organizations are even more isolated, as other actors tend to ignore them. The relationship is asymmetrical, as unemployed organizations mention actors they have tried to influence or disagreed with, but the reverse is not true, that is, they are not mentioned back by those actors. Thus, organizations of the unemployed are not only weak and loosely structured, but also peripheral in the unemployment political field. Given these organizational structures, in what kind of activities has the unemployed engaged in? 
Activities and Forms of Action
The unemployed in Switzerland display a very low level of mobilization. If we look at the claim-making data, unemployed organizations and groups account for far less than 1 percent of all claims. Thus, unemployed are virtually absent from the public domain as claim-makers and their actions are rarely reported in the media. One would be tempted to say that the low level of mobilization of the unemployed is obvious in a country that has one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe. However, this explanation seems not very convincing in light of the developments that occurred since the early 1990s, both in the unemployment rate and in the public perception of this issue. Others would explain such a low level of mobilization with the very characteristics of the groups of the unemployed. For example, as Rosanvallon (1995) writes, "The difficulty to mobilize and to represent the excluded is explained by the fact that they first define themselves through the failures of their existence, through a negativity therefore" (203; our translation). According to this view, the unemployed do not form a social group with common interests. Similarly, other authors have pointed to the lack of a collective identity among the unemployed, or at least to the difficulty to build one, which would make their political mobilization very unlikely (e.g., Faniel 2003 While we agree that a low level of common interest and a weak collective identity make the mobilization of the unemployed particularly difficult, we think that the extremely low level of mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland is due to other reasons as well. In particular, it depends on the weakness of preexisting networks and organizations, which are crucial factors in shaping collective interests and identities. Preexisting networks and organizations as well as collective interests and identities, in turn, are influenced by the institutional approaches to unemployment, which characterize a given polity and which provide a set of institutional and discursive opportunities channeling the extent and forms of the claim-making of the unemployed. As we try to show, in Switzerland such a specific political opportunity structure is particularly unfavorable to the mobilization of the unemployed.
However, the political activities of an organization are not limited to overt protest or other forms of mobilization in the public domain, such as those usually reported in the media. Other channels of influence and mobilization exist. To deal with these other channels and how the unemployed use them in Switzerland, we can look at the information that we can draw from the interviews with unemployed organizations. In the interviews, unemployed organizations were asked to tell whether they use different forms of action in political activities aimed to defend their rights and interests, either on a regular or on an occasional basis ( table 9.5 ).
14 Unemployed organizations are forced to limit the range of their actions due to their poor resources. For example, they use mediarelated strategies, some on a regular basis. Informing the public does not occur on a regular basis (only one organization, among those we interviewed, said it uses this form of action regularly). Lobbying and consultations are more frequent, but not used on a regular basis. Unemployed organizations usually try to influence the policymakers by informing them about the situation faced by the unemployed, and the government asks about the position of unemployed organizations. Policy and intermediary actors have made it quite clear that the surprising success of an unemployed organization in launching a referendum against a change in the unemployment law has strengthened the position of unemployed Kitschelt (1986) has called a procedural impact. These organizations also make frequent use of court action on behalf of the unemployed whose social benefits have been reduced or suspended. Campaign contributions are quite low and mainly restricted to nonfinancial forms of contributions, again due to their limited resources. Concerning the mobilization of the public, unemployed organizations are quite active, although not on a regular basis. They are especially active in direct fund-raising and are dependent on this source of money to survive and carry on their activities in favor of the unemployed. They also use protest activities, but not very often, as can also be inferred from the low level of mobilization observed in the claim-making data. These figures show that the organizations of the unemployed do engage in various types of activities, although this is based on a self-evaluative criterion, which tells us nothing about the actual frequency of use of the various forms of action. We probably are on the safe side if we say that unemployed organizations are less active than, for example, intermediary organizations, even with regard to these less publicly visible activities. In any event, the comparatively lower level of mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland seems to confirm that their political activities have much difficulty to gain visibility in the public domain and that the unemployed have little legitimacy to enter the public discourse. This may have two main reasons. First, the unemployed have trouble developing collective identities and organizational structures that may help them to engage in political mobilization. Second, the discourse and actions of the unemployed are not always listened to and considered legitimate by other actors as well as by the media, at least mainstream media. Can they have an impact on such an unfavorable question?
Policy Impact
According to the description made so far, the political mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland is unlikely and remains very weak. We described a group that is more a social category than a social group, lacks a collective identity, has weak organizational structures, whose resources are scarce at the political, social, and economic levels, and faces a hostile institutional and discursive context. Concerning the final aspect, we maintain in particular that the way the debate is framed, mainly in economic terms and focusing on workers threatened by unemployment, has made the unemployed a marginal object in public discourse in the unemployment political field. In such a context, the unemployed face difficulties in mobilizing, and even when they do mobilize they have trouble entering the public domain through media coverage. Furthermore, they have a peripheral position within the network structure in the field.
However, sometimes unemployed mobilization does occur and can even be successful. For example, in the early 1990s, when unemployment started to rise, there were some instances of mobilization by the national federation of 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 236 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 236 9/26/2011 9:47:47 PM 9/26/2011 9:47:47 PM unemployed organizations (FEDAC), which was able to set up a protest march attended by more than 10,000 people in February 1993, during a parliamentary session dealing with issues relating to unemployment. To do so, however, they took advantage of the support of trade unions. As a result, the FEDAC felt it had been instrumentalized by the unions, which took a central stage position during the protest (Duvanel 2002) . Other smaller activities took place, but on the whole the protest was quite limited and short-lived (ibid.). Perhaps the most interesting instance of successful mobilization by organized unemployed in Switzerland, however, took place in 1996. In that year, all the conditions for mobilization were present and organized unemployed took advantage of a window of opportunity. That year the parliament passed a change of the unemployment law that was quite detrimental for the rights of unemployed. Their potential allies did not believe in any chance of success and refused to launch a referendum, which, together with the popular initiative is one of the main instruments in the hands of actors from the civil society to challenge policy proposals. An unemployed organization (the ADC NE) then decided to launch a referendum single-handedly. Using its own structures and networks, which in fact were not very strong, it managed to contact other local unemployed organizations, far-leftist parties, and small unions. Quite surprisingly for most observers, the unemployed were able to collect more than the 50,000 signatures required to bring the referendum to the popular vote. This represents a first major success of this campaign. In the following stages of the process, unions and the socialist party took the responsibility for leading the campaign. Again quite surprisingly, the referendum was accepted by voters in 1997, although with a narrow margin.
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This example suggests that often the unemployed must rely on their own structures and resources, and sometimes are indeed able to do so, but it also shows the relative weakness of such structures and resources, as well as the relative disinterest or lack of confidence of the potential allies that are leftist parties and unions. Yet this successful mobilization would not have been possible without the instruments provided by direct democracy, which is an important aspect of the general political opportunity structure in Switzerland (Kriesi et al. 1995) . At the same time, this example shows the weakness of the alliance structures of the unemployed. The fact that the major successful mobilization by the unemployed occurred without the initial support by political allies suggests that institutional actors do not have a specific interest in establishing alliances with unemployed organizations.
Thus, this mobilization is in a way paradoxical; it represents the peak of the mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland, but it also shows their weakness. The windows of opportunity were characterized by a rare mix of contingent situations: a change in the unemployment law, growing unemployment, higher levels of public awareness, and the absence of political allies. The unemployed do not have a tradition of mobilization in Switzerland, but they can occasionally achieve mobilization in very rare and particular conditions. In this case, the weapons offered by the political system were crucial, both for the mobilization and for its success. The unemployed remained inside 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 237 9780230619395_11_ch09.indd 237 9/26/2011 9:47:48 PM 9/26/2011 9:47:48 PM the institutional rules of the game. The mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland seems to be a contingent reaction to a contingent situation. This successful mobilization did not only have a substantial impact on legislation, but it also had what Gamson (1990) has called "acceptance" and Kitschelt (1986) "procedural impact." Some of the actors we interviewed in out study pointed to the fact that, after that day, unemployed organizations are more often consulted during the legislative process. However, we should not overestimate the actual power of the ADC NE as well as that of the other ADCs, as the collective interests represented by unions and especially by employer's associations are obviously the dominant ones.
We should also note that a referendum launched by leftist parties and unions aimed to fight another change of the unemployment law threatening to deteriorate the rights of unemployed was defeated by popular vote in 2003. However, at that time the situation of the labor market was better than in 1996, although it was worsening again. Furthermore, the parliament used the weapon of policy instruments, in the form of a number of proposed legislative changes aimed at improving the situation of the unemployed. This suggests that the possibilities for successful mobilization by the unemployed vary in time and that certain conditions in the economic, social, and political environment can facilitate their task. Here we have focused on political conditions.
Conclusion
The most striking characteristic of the political mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland is their virtual absence from the public domain as collective actors. To be sure, the level of mobilization of jobless people is quite low everywhere. Yet the Swiss unemployed seem to be particularly inactive, both with regard to their claim-making in the public domain and the less visible forms of actions that are carried by organizations. We have suggested that the weak mobilization by the unemployed is the result of a cumulative effect of a number of factors, going from the lack of interest that unemployed have in political participation, to the difficulty of creating a collective identity, to the scarce resources they have at their disposal to mobilize, to the specific way the issue of unemployment is framed in the public domain. However, here we have focused on the role of specific (institutional and especially discursive) opportunities deriving from the prevailing conception of the welfare state.
Another characteristic of the unemployed in Switzerland, partly resulting from the unfavorable political context, is their disorganization and lack of internal resources. There are few unemployed organizations, and the existing ones dispose of very limited material resources. This also depends on the fact that it is difficult to ensure a sustained flow of resources and to find a permanent leadership, given the conjunctural nature of unemployment. It is difficult, in such a situation, to create organizations that go beyond episodic collective action and allow the interests of the unemployed to be represented in the long run. The lack of organization probably goes hand in hand with the difficulty of building a strong collective identity. Again, this may result in part from the specific way in which the issue of unemployment is framed in the public domain. The analysis of the claims made in the field of unemployment politics suggests that the unemployed are seen mostly as people having lost their job temporarily. In the prevailing view, unemployment is not a social problem in itself. This kind of framing leaves little room for the creation of a collective identity of unemployed and also little legitimacy to the organizations and groups defending the interests and rights of the unemployed. In brief, unemployment, rather than the unemployed as a social category whose interests and rights are threatened, is at the center of public discourse. This provides more opportunities for the mobilization of actors who stress the (economic) solution of the problem of unemployment than those who focus on the social condition of the constituency group.
In light of these characteristics, it is at best imprudent to speak of a social movement of the unemployed in Switzerland. At the same time, however, some instances of mobilization have indeed taken place, although they have remained sporadic and quite limited in numbers. Furthermore, the rare episodes of contention made use of the institutional channels provided by the Swiss political system, such as direct democracy, like in the example just evoked. Most importantly, the lack of internal organization and coordination, as well as the weak collective identity, prevents us from saying that there has been a movement of the unemployed in Switzerland. The most important of such episodes of contention is perhaps the launching of the referendum against the decision of the Federal government to reduce the level of unemployment social benefits in 1996, an effort that, moreover, was successful. This suggests that, in spite of an unfavorable institutional and discursive environment stemming from the dominant conception of the welfare state and the way in which the issue of unemployment is framed in Switzerland, in spite of weak organizational structures, and in spite of a weak collective identity, protest activities of a marginal social group can nevertheless emerge, although not in a consistent fashion. 
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1. This kind of explanation ref lects what are often been called grievance theories, which stress the impact of discontent as a source of collective action (e.g., Turner and Killian 1957; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970) . These theories have lost much of their popularity among students of social movements and have largely been discarded in favor of resource mobilization or opportunity theories. However, given the strong and direct link between the economic situation and unemployment, it is worth asking whether, in this field, the objective condition does not play a role. In fact, a simple correlation between the unemployment rate (the most straightforward indicator of objective condition in this field) and the level of mobilization of the unemployed in the six countries of the UNEMPOL project suggests that such a role is at best very limited (Giugni 2008 ). 2. In the social movement literature, this kind of explanatory factors has been stressed by the framing perspective (e.g., Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992; Gamson 1992 Gamson , 1995 state, the prevailing strategy of the authorities to deals with challengers, and the structure of political alignments and the presence of allies within the institutional arenas (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; see McAdam 1996 and Kriesi 2004 for reviews). 6. This figure comes from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). In Switzerland two
indicators are commonly used to analyze the situations of unemployed: The statistics of the unemployed registered at the regional job placement offices drawn up by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the statistics of the unemployed recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). The data of the latter are collected by means of the SLFS, an interview based on a household sampling, which is conducted annually since 1991 in order to obtain data about working environment and professional life in general. To ensure the international comparability of the so collected labor market indicators, the SLFS organizes its interviews according to the recommendations of the ILO and the norms of the OECD. 7. This information is based on a survey carried out by the GfS research institute (Arbeitslosigkeit macht zunehmend Kummer. NZZ 292, December 16, 2003). 8. For an explanation of the delay in the development of the Swiss welfare state, see Armingeon (2001, 152-5 ). 9. These authors also noticed that these measures might point out a difference between "good unemployed," who show good behavior and goodwill, and "bad unemployed," who do not comply with the new rules and demands. 10. Such a situation of mistrust toward the unemployed, but at the same time a relatively generous level of compensation may be explained in political economic terms. Switzerland has both a f lexible labor market and an open economy. Small countries with open economies must develop trade-off policies for their population to accept the risks and side effects of such openness (Katzenstein 1984 (Katzenstein , 1985 . The relative generosity of the unemployment scheme may be in part a result of this trade-off policy. In addition, the f lexibility of the labor market is very valuable for employers. As a result, they might be willing to accept a generous unemployment law as long as it does not interfere with labor market regulations. More generally speaking, labor market regulations are an important explanatory factor of the situation of unemployment in a given country. 11. Duvanel (2002) The coding was done following a sampling procedure. Specifically, we coded all claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues and found in international, national, and economic sections of the newspaper (in addition to the front page). In addition, in order to improve coverage, claims reported in the issue consulted and which took place up to two week before or which will take place up to two weeks after the date of appearance of that issue were also coded. The unit of analysis is the single political claim, broadly defined as a strategic intervention, either verbal or nonverbal, in the public space made by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity and which bears on the interests or rights of other groups or collectivities. In other words, a claim is the expression of a political opinion by verbal or physical action in the public domain. If it is verbal, a claim usually consists of a statement, an opinion, a demand, a criticism, a policy suggestion, and so on addressed to the public in general or to a specific actor. A political claim can take three main forms: (1) political decision (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.), (2) verbal statement (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.); and (3) protest action (demonstration, occupation, violent action, etc.). All claims taking one of these forms have been coded, provided that they fell in the unemployment issue field. For each claim retrieved we coded a number of relevant variables. The most important are: the location in time and place of the claim, the actor who makes the claim and its policy position relating to the issue at stake, the form of the claim, the thematic focus of the claim, the target of the claim, and the object of the claim (i.e., the constituency group). 13. We have carried out forty-two semistructured interviews with main national and local actors within the contentious field of unemployment in Switzerland, focusing on direct action and involvement of the actors in the public and policy domains. Interviews have been conducted with: (1) policy actors and state institutions; (2) intermediary actors such as political parties, unions, and employers' organizations; (3) nongovernmental organizations, welfare organizations, and probeneficiary charities; and (4) groups promoting direct mobilization/participation of the unemployed themselves. The interview schedule for each category of actors has been specifically designed to analyze where these actors locate themselves in relation to other actors within the same field. They include not only qualitative in-depth questions (examining, e.g., the framing of the issues and the "perceived" role of legislative provisions and policies for structuring actors' demands) but also sets of standardized questions that aim to investigate action repertoires, mobilization and communication strategies, institutions on which demands are made, as well as relationships of inf luence, cooperation, and disagreement among different types of organizations in the field. It should be emphasized that the questionnaire has also gathered information on how actors from the public and policy domains see the potential inf luence of increasing European integration in the unemployment field. Interviewees have thus been asked to give more open-ended prognostic statements, thus allowing for comparison of the opinions expressed by actors of different types. See the appendix for the full list of organizations interviewed. 14. were standardized using the following steps: (1) add up all mentions (regular and occasional combined) of forms of action within a given category by type of actor; (2) divide by the number of forms of action in the category; and (3) divide by the number of actors in each type of actor. 15. See Duvanel (2002) for a detailed account of the mobilization process. This author stresses in particular the difficulty, apart from a few exceptions, in contacting other unemployed organizations, as there was not many of them, especially in the German part of Switzerland, and that it was difficult to get in touch and work with them, as they were often no longer active or very small both in terms of members and resources. For example, the FEDAC became an empty shell in 1996, no longer having an active role and being largely dependent of the participation of local members that were mostly inactive. The signature campaign was an example of a mixture of amateurism and efficiency, use of scarce resources, and overwhelming in its success. Furthermore, both the gathering of the signatures and the vote displayed significant difference between the French-speaking and the German-speaking parts of the country. It was easier to gather the signatures in the French-speaking part.
